Abstract: Market power on each side of a multisided platform, whether in the form of increasing prices or decreasing quality, is constrained by the risk of losing sales on the other sides. That tends to weaken market power on each side and encourages platforms to keep prices lower and quality higher than they would absent these feedback effects. In some cases the nature of the business model, and competition, result in the platform allowing one type of customers to participate in the platform for free or even to subsidize their participation. Non-price methods of attracting customers are especially important in this case, particularly when the business model adopted by the industry makes it difficult for platforms to move from free participation. To provide a reliable assessment of competitive constraints, market power analysis must consider the interdependencies in demand by the participants on the platform as well as have heightened focus on non-price competition when the participation for one group is free. Market shares should be used cautiously in assessing market power for multi-sided platforms, especially when they reflect only one side of the platform, and therefore do not account for the interdependent customer groups, or concern a free platform side where there is no monetary measure of value. Finally, dynamic competition makes the analysis of market power complex because it results in feature competition, and potentially drastic innovation, on one side of a platform that has feedback effects on the other side of the platform. The courts and authorities have recognized these points in Qihoo 360 v. Tencent, Cartes Bancaires v. European Commission, the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, and the Microsoft/Skype merger. These principals should become part of the standard analysis of multi-sided platforms by courts and competition authorities globally. These concerns are illustrated in the context of multi-sided platforms that offer online services where free services and dynamic competition are especially important.
I. Introduction and Summary
Many online businesses operate multi-sided platforms that help different types of participants get together and enter into value-increasing exchanges. Facebook, for example, makes it possible for friends, businesses, advertisers, and developers to interact with each other. This business model has ancient roots going back at least as far as the village matchmaker. In making economically reliable assessments, however, competition authorities, as well as courts, should account for three features of these online platforms set them apart from many other businesses in evaluating the market power held by these platforms.
First, the demands by the different groups of participants served by multi-sided platforms are interdependent. As a simple mathematical matter, that interdependency renders standard 3 formulas wrong at least without significant modifications. 2 In particular, a price increase, or quality decrease, to one group of participants reduces the demand not only by that group but also by the other groups who then have fewer participants with which to interact. That does not mean that an online platform could not have market power, only that the analysis needs to consider these interdependencies and the resulting feedback effects.
Second, many online businesses make the platform "free" to one group of participants, or even subsidize those participants, and earn profits from the other groups of participants who they do charge. 3 Although the basic concepts of competition policy analysis apply to free prices, many of the traditional tools used for competition policy analysis, such as the SSNIP test, do not work, without significant modification, as a straightforward mathematical matter. Most importantly, though, the existence of a group of customers who are served for free highlights the importance of considering the other interdependent sides in assessing market power. The platform is ordinarily making participation "free" for a group because that group is very important for attracting paid participants. Anything that deters "free" users from participating-such as a decrease in qualityalso reduces the incentives for the paid users, who generate all the profits, from participating as well.
Third, online platforms often engage in constant incremental innovation as they seek to obtain advantages over rivals to attract participants on multiple sides and are subject to episodic, but increasingly frequent, disruptive innovation in which new, or seemingly different, firms attract their customers away. This dynamic competition is particularly important for "attention" platforms for which competition is designed to attract the attention of users, which is then resold to marketers, should let their guard down when it comes to online platforms. Taken together, however, with the new economics of multi-sided platforms, and the growing body of evidence on the dynamics of online competition over the last two-decades, these judgments and decisions do indicate that courts and competition authorities should exercise caution, and adjust their tools, in analyzing market power for online platforms.
This paper describes the new economics of multi-sided platforms in Section II. Then it shows in Section III how new technologies have turbocharged this business model and led to online mobile platforms anchored by websites and mobile apps. Section IV examines the implications of the online multi-sided platform business model for the analysis of market power for attention seekers. Section V offers some concluding observations. India. 13 Based on the experience of countries in Africa, where the mobile money markets are more mature, we would expect the in the long run the market will have several competing providers.
II. The New Economics of Multi-Sided Platforms
14 Multi-sided platforms differ fundamentally from the traditional firms described in economic textbooks and business school courses. Traditional firms typically buy inputs, they make products, and they sell those products to customers. They operate along linear supply chain. And since they do not have customers with interdependent demands they are single-sided. Multisided platforms sell participants in each group access to the participants in each other group. As a result, the customers are the main inputs into providing the platform service. A typical retail store, which is a single-sided firm, buys products from wholesale distributors or manufacturers and then sells them to customers.
A shopping mall, which is a two-sided firm, recruits stores for its mall, and recruits shoppers to come to its mall, and provides a platform where the stores get access to the shoppers and the shoppers get access to the stores.
B. Pricing Structures and Strategies
The fact that the demand for one group depends on the demand by the other group has interesting implications for how multisided platforms price their services. Platforms have to choose prices that balance these demands. Higher prices for Type As would discourage them from participating in the platform. That would deter Type Bs from participating in the platform since they would have access to fewer Type A participants. In fact, it may make sense to price very low to one group of participants because the other group will pay a high price for access to them. That, in fact, is the secret behind advertising-supported media as we show below.
It could even make sense to subsidize one group by charging them a price less than the incremental cost of serving them, including letting them use the platform for free, or even giving them rewards for participating. Economists have shown that, as a matter of theory, platforms may be able to maximize profits by subsidizing one side of the platform in this way and that, as matter of fact, many platforms have do just that. 15 A popular restaurant reservation site in the U.S.,
OpenTable, for example does not charge people to make reservations with its site and it gives them rewards that they apply to reduce the cost of their meals. Although "free" is popular for online platforms it is by no means universal. Dating sites, such as Trulymadly in India and
FarmersOnly.com in the US, charge men and women the same. They contrast with nightclubs which, in the US, have "Ladies Night Free" pricing.
C. Advertising-Supported Platforms
Some multi-sided platforms connect consumers and advertisers. This might seem odd since in many cases consumers do not like advertising. They even spend money to avoid it by, for example, buying DVRs that make it easy to skip over ads and paying for alternative sources of media, such as Pay TV, or ad-free versions of services, such as Spotify Premium.
These platforms, however, have figured out ways to connect consumers and advertisers in ways that make both groups better off. They typically offer valuable content to persuade people consumer to come of their platforms where these people are exposed to advertising messages.
15 See Evans and Schmalensee, Matchmakers, Table 2 .1.
Meanwhile they persuade advertisers to pay for reaching these people. The viewers are the subsidy side of the platform and the advertisers are the money side. So long as the advertisers are willing to pay more for delivering messages to these consumers than the platform spends on content the advertisers benefit, the consumers benefit, and the platform makes money.
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One can think of ad-supported platforms as buying eyeballs-usually by paying with valuable content-and selling those eyeballs to advertisers. The Internet has made that far easier as we see next.
III. Online Multi-Sided Platforms
Online platforms have become more common and prominent participants in domestic economies and some have rapidly become global players. Many of these online platforms provide free content or services to people to attract their "attention" and then charge advertisers for delivering messages to these people. These attention seekers engage in dynamic competition in which they are constantly introducing new ways of attracting attention, and copying methods used by others, to persuade people to come to their platforms. Smart mobile phones have accelerated the pace of dynamic competition, the frequency of disruptive innovation, for online platforms.
A. The Technology Revolutions Behind Online Platforms
Several mutually reinforcing technologies, and the businesses the make those technologies available, have made multi-sided platforms increasingly powerful methods for reducing frictions, and creating valuable new services, on a global basis.
The PC-Web-Browser Revolution
The first wave of innovation launched the web-economy in the mid 1990s. The Internet provided a physical network and standards for connecting computers around the world, the Web provided a framework and software technologies for creating and linking content on those computers, and the web browser provided an application for personal computers that enabled people to consume Web content.
Businesses could use these technologies to provide content and services on websites. The cost of doing so was relatively low since it involved writing software, using server computers, and . 17 Apple and Google also stimulated the production of mobile apps by providing software tools for developing apps for their operating systems, creating a quality certification process for these apps, and creating "app stores" that provided centralized places for developers to distribute apps and for users to download them on their mobile devices.
Smart mobile phones changed the online game in a number of ways as they became widely adopted, millions of apps became available for them, and faster and more capacious mobile broadband networks were rolled out around the world. People could access the Internet anywhere and anytime using smartphones running on mobile broadband networks. More people could do that because mobile phones and data plans were much cheaper than buying PCs and fixed broadband connections. Businesses could reach billions of people by developing mobile apps and distributing them in apps stores. Apps could exploit the GPS capabilities of phones, which make it possible to know where individuals are in physical space. This, together with the related development of the "Internet of Things" is leading to the deep integration of the online and physical worlds.
The Movement from PCs/Browsers to Mobile/Apps
Businesses that want to provide online services, and consumers who want to consume online services now have several choices. App developers can develop websites that people can visit from browsers on their PCs or from their mobile devices. They can develop mobile apps that people use on their mobile phones or mobile browser-apps that try to mimic these apps. Different businesses have adopted different approaches depending on the content and services they are providing. Consumers have, however, shifted their use dramatically from PCs to mobile devices and from using websites to using apps. On mobile devices people typically access Internet-based services using mobile apps rather than using websites with their mobile browser. Mobile apps accounted for nearly 90 percent of the time Americans spend using mobile apps or browsers on their mobile devices. 
B. Overview of Online Multi-Sided Platforms
The development of online technologies has made it cheaper and easier to reduce frictions through multi-sided platforms and to do so over large geographic areas. The Internet makes it possible to connect participants over wide geographic areas and in principle from around the world.
Software programs running on high-speed computers in the cloud provide powerful technologies for finding good matches and consummating exchanges. Mobile has extended these capabilities throughout the day and throughout physical space.
Almost immediately after web commerce became viable in the mid 1990s entrepreneurs started using the new technologies to start multi-sided platforms. Not everyone chose a multi-sided model. Amazon, for example, started with a typical retail model in which it bought products, initially books, wholesale and sold them to people through its online store. Many, though, used a multisided approach often because it was the only way to provide the product or service. eBay started an online marketplace for buyers and sellers, match.com started an online matchmaker for men and 26 BGR, "90% of Facebook's 132 million users from India come from mobile phones," September 27, 2015, available at http://www.bgr.in/news/90-of-facebooks-132-million-users-from-india-come-from-mobile-phones/ 27 Ashwini Gangal, "'Over 60 per cent of our traffic comes through mobile': Manish Kalra, Amazon India," August 28, 2015, http://www.afaqs.com/interviews/index.html?id=469_Over-60-per-cent-of-our-traffic-comes-through-mobileManish-Kalra-Amazon-India 28 BGR, "Smartphone shopping to contribute up to 70 percent of total revenue in online shopping: Experts," November 30, 2014, available at http://www.bgr.in/news/smartphone-shopping-to-contribute-up-to-70-percent-of-total-revenuein-online-shopping-experts/.
women, and Yahoo started a online portal that used content to attract viewers and then attracted advertisers who wanted to reach those views.
Many of the established platforms followed the shift from the PC-browser-centric model to the mobile-app centric model. Entrepreneurs, however, discovered that the mobile-app centric model provided new opportunities. Uber, for example, has built a business that connects drivers and riders in real-time and in physical space using mobile apps. Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of online multi-sided platforms based on their presence in the US, which reflects global platforms, and India, which reflects domestic platforms and global ones. In each country we have selected 20 platforms. We include the largest ones based on the number of times over the space of a month people clicked on pages on those sites ("pageviews").
That is a particularly useful measure for content-oriented sites. We have erred on the side of showing diversity of online platforms and the table is not intended to be an accurate summary of the economically most important online platforms. In each case we summarize the multi-sided business model and the extent to which one side receives service for free.
As these tables show online platforms are highly diverse. However, they often have several of the following features that are relevant for antitrust analysis. First, they are all based on software.
They can add new features, and introduce new products and services, by modifying or adding software code and related databases. That is much different than physical platforms. Second, the marginal cost of participants to software-based platforms running in the cloud is virtually zero. That increases the normal tendency of multi-sided platforms to allow a group of participants to use the platform for free. Third, dynamic competition is more intense for online platforms because technological change has reduced the capital cost of starting a platform and the software-based nature of these platforms makes it easier for platforms to offer new products and services in competition with other platforms. 29 Fourth, dynamic competition is also more intense for online platforms because the participants have lower switching costs, and face less lock-in, than on physical platforms where they often have to make costly sunk-cost commitments to the platform. Fifth, online platforms are in the midst of a massive technological shift resulting from the move of consumers from the PC-browser to the mobile-app centric way of using online services. 30 These points are especially true one of the largest categories on online platforms. 
C. Online Attention Seekers
At is has turned out many online platforms make money primarily by helping businesses sell things to consumers through advertising and marketing. 31 As we discussed above the way they do this is simple but clever. They provide reasons to consumers to come visit them by offering engaging content or services valued by consumers. Consumers typically do not pay for obtaining the content or services. They are free in that sense. But consumers are receiving value by coming to these platforms. In that sense the real price of participating in the platform is even better than free, it is negative, so that platform is paying consumers to come visit. Once they have gotten consumers to spend time of the platform they allow businesses to present advertising or other marketing messages to consumers. They charge businesses for this and that is how they cover their costs and make profits.
Online attention seekers compete to get the attention of consumers and then sell portions of that attention to businesses that aren't able to get it easily on their own. They seldom make any money directly from providing content or services to consumers. Recognizing this is important for understanding the dynamics of competition. Entrepreneurs compete to come up with clever ideas for attracting eyeballs-say by inventing tweeting or pinning-not so they can charge people for clever content or services they are providing but so they can sell access to those eyeballs to advertisers. Attention seekers may come up with ways to differentiate themselves from the standpoint of attracting consumer attention and selling advertising. But overall they are competing to attract a limited pool of attention and advertising and marketing budgets to reach those consumers. Now consider the five features that we highlighted above. Attention seekers are all built on software platforms. They do not have printing presses, cable networks, or radio towers. When they want to add features to the platforms they hire software engineers to write code. They can often make changes quickly and roll those changes out globally. It took about 5 months, for example, for Facebook to develop Facebook Messenger which is one of the leading apps for smartphones.
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The marginal cost of another participant on an attention seeker is essentially zero. Google does not incur any significant out of pocket cost when a person conducts another search or when it puts another search ad on a search results page. That is true for virtually all attention seekers with the exception of some, such as Pandora, that have to pay for the content they deliver.
The capital cost of starting an attention seeker is low and that has intensified dynamic competition. That is more so true now as a result of mobile apps. The founders of WhatsApp had to write software code so that messaging app would work for Apple and Android phones and for the cloud-based service those apps were connected with. 33 Once they did that they had a platform that could provide messaging services globally to unlimited number of users with the addition of some cheap server capacity. Many other mobile messaging apps have started. They compete with older messaging PC-based messaging apps as well as the new mobile-based ones.
It is easy for consumers to reduce the amount of attention they provide one platform, or drop it altogether, and increase the amount of attention they provide another platform. Since the platforms are free they can use as many as they want and switch their attention depending upon the 32 Facebook, "Building Facebook Messenger," August 12, 2011, available at https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-engineering/building-facebook-messenger/10150259350998920/. 33 One estimate is that it would cost about $250,000 and take about nine months to build a robust version of an app like WhatsApp. See Courtney Boyd Myers, "How much does it cost to build the world's hottest startups?" TNW News, December 2, 2013. Available at http://thenextweb.com/dd/2013/12/02/much-cost-build-worlds-hotteststartups/#gref 22 relative attractiveness to spending time on one or the other. The consumer bears no cost from shifting time from looking at Yahoo to looking at Flipboard. While some online platforms involve some cost of switching in practice it does not limit people from doing so. In the case of social networks, Americans switched from Friendster to MySpace and then from MySpace to Facebook. 34 People in other countries, such as Brazil and India, switched from Orkut to Facebook. 35 Finally, the shift of consumers from looking at websites with their browsers to using apps on their mobile phones has resulted in dramatic changes in attention seeking platforms. There has been a dramatic increase in the amount of online attention available as a result of people being able to go online with their mobile devices for much more of the day. The opportunities for connecting businesses with consumers have also changed now that people carry mobile phones all the time and in particular when they go shopping. Search is one of the attention-seeking businesses that is undergoing disruption as a result of this. 36 Search engines index websites and allow people to find things on those websites. But now an enormous amount of online activity is happening with mobile apps. At this point it is unclear how people will be able to find app-based content and what companies will ultimately succeed in doing so. Apple, Facebook, and Google are among the companies that are trying to figure this out. 37 What's should be clear from the discussion so far is that multi-sided platforms are governed by different rules than traditional linear businesses and that competition among online platforms is often more intense and more dynamic than among physical platforms. Both point have important implications for antirust analysis.
IV. Market Power Analysis of Online Attention Seekers
Economists typically assume that the demand for a product depends on the price of that product, the price of substitute products, and the price of complementary products. The demand for a particular brand of beer, for example, depends on the price of that brand, the prices of other kinds of beer and other alcoholic beverages, and perhaps the demand for nuts, chips, and other things that people eat with beer. Most economic theories relied on in antitrust analysis, such as those involving predatory pricing, and economic tools, such as SSNIP tests, are based on this model of product demand.
All of those factors are relevant for considering the demand for product and services provided by multi-sided platforms. But those standard factors do not include the most critical factor that drives the demand for platforms. The demand by members of one group of customers, say Type A, depends, roughly speaking, on the participation of the other group of customers, say Type B, in the platform. 38 To avoid being mathematically wrong and unreliable, economic models and tools must account for the interdependent demand and consider all sides of the platforms. The fact that the demands by the various groups of platform participants are interdependent also means that 38 More precisely, platform customers care about the likelihood that they will be able to enter into valuable exchange on the platform; we are using the number of potential trading partners as a short-hand for describing all of the characteristics of one side of the platform that affects the demand by the other side.
analyses that focus on one group of participants in isolation are not correct as a straightforward mathematical matter. 39 Antitrust analysis needs to examine the platform overall taking these interdependencies into account. 40 Generally, that requires treating the platform as a whole, rather than focusing on one group of customers or another, or at least carefully considering the inter-linkages between these groups. Platform competition tends to force overall prices down and reduces the profits the platform can earn. Typically, though, it does not force prices down to incremental costs for all, or even any, sides of the platform. Even with competition platforms may choose to subsidize one side of the platform and make profits for other sides of the platform.
The magazine business, for example, is highly competitive yet most magazines subsidize readers; the cover price for the magazine often does not cover printing and distribution costs let along the cost of the content that attracts readers. In fact, competition to attract participants to the platform can result in greater subsidies to one side. For example, in the U.S., competition among payment card networks apparently resulted in bidding up payments (called interchange fees) to banks that issue cards to consumers. 41 As a result, evidence that price is great than incremental cost on one side provides no meaningful evidence that the platform has market power and evidence that the platform charges a price less than marginal cost on another side provides no meaningful evidence that the platform is engaging in predatory pricing. The analyst needs to look at the platform overall to assess market power and predation. In practice, it often makes sense to look at pricing and competition on both sides but then accounting for the interdependencies.
This section applies these general principles to the analysis of market power for online attention seekers which is one of the most important categories of online platforms.
A. Free and Feature Competition
Traditional antitrust analysis assesses market power by considering whether the firm can increase price profitably. That approach does not make any economic or business sense for online attention seekers. The business is based on paying consumers to use the platform and charging advertisers for access to those consumers. An exercise of market power over consumers would could involve increasing the price to them but, more likely, would involve reducing the quality of the content and services the platform is providing to attract their attention. 42 Whether that reduction in quality is profitable depends on the extent to which it would decrease the attractiveness of the platform to advertisers. A platform could consider reducing its expenditures on quality improvements by $1 million. Whether this is profitable depends on whether the lower quality would reduce the amount of advertising, given the lower attention it attracts, by less than $1 million. 41 OECD, "Competition and Payment Systems," June 28, 2013, http://www.oecd.org/competition/PaymentSystems2012.pdf. 42 The decision by online attention seekers to charge fees is quite rare even for ones that are highly successful. Some online newspapers have tried paywalls with mixed success.
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This highlights the importance of feature and quality competition. Online attention seekers do not compete based on price. Therefore, to assess market power, one needs to assess the extent to which a lower provision of quality would divert attention to other online platforms. In considering that diversion there is no business or economic reason to limit the inquiry to online platforms that provide the same service. It is an empirical question whether consumers would turn their attention to completely different services.
In practice market power analysis for online attention seekers can consider substitution possibilities by considering a small but significant increase in price or a small but significant decrease in quality. Either one reduces the value of the platform for users and could induce switching. The SSNIP, however, must consider small absolute increase in price since a percentage increase is undefined when the initial price is zero. The Chinese Supreme People's Court, in Qihoo 360 v.
Tencent, decided that the SSNIP evidence was not relevant and considered informally how consumers would react to small but significant decreases in quality (SSNDQ) of the instant message products under consideration.
43
Since attention makers make virtually all of the revenue and profit from advertisers the other issue concerning market power is whether they can take actions that increase the price of advertising above competitive level. The analysis of that question needs to consider the extent to which advertisers can get the attention of consumers in other ways and the extent to which the online platform offers some consumer attention, perhaps based on demographic profiles or the context in which they've captured that attention, for which there are limited substitutes.
Free pricing, however, shouldn't be analyzed in isolation. In fact, the existence of consumers being offered something for nothing is almost always an indication that the business is a multi-sided platform. That means that the demand by consumers on the "paid side" is linked to the demand by consumers on the "free side" to the demand. The SSNIP and SSDNQ analyses should account for the interdependencies of demand for taking a holistic approach, and considering the platform overall, or by carefully considering the linkages in demand and their implications for competitive constraints.
B. New Entry, Cross-Category Entry, and Feature Competition
Market power analysis needs to consider the ease of entry and of feature competition for online attention seekers. As discussed above the capital cost of entry for online attention seekers is low. The main difficulty is attracting consumers to the platform with persuasive content and services. Importantly, though, the analysis needs to at least consider the impact on the platform of entry by completely different services. For example, suppose Facebook reduced its investment in the quality of its social networking platform. It could lose advertising revenue in part because that increases the likelihood that consumers will more likely to shift attention to "the next new thing"-not necessarily to a social network-and that will cost the company advertising revenues. In addition, market power analysis needs to consider entry from other categories. Because it is easy to change features through software online attention seekers can add features that mimic those of other very different attention seekers. Twitter and Pinterest, for example, have both recently introduced "buy buttons" that help businesses make sales on their platforms, like Amazon Marketplace, in addition to just advertising to those consumers. That feature competition is an example of dynamic competition which we turn to next.
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C. Dynamic Competition
Dynamic competition has characterized online attention seekers for the last twenty years and shows no signs of abating. Attention seekers have no guarantee that they can hold onto consumers without engaging in persistent incremental feature and disruptive innovation. We see this in a variety of ways.
First, the relative importance of attention seekers changes dramatically over time. 44 Table 3 shows 45 Facebook overtook it in July 2010. 46 MySpace had a similar experience in the US where it was the largest between 2005 and 2009 and also displaced by Facebook. 47 Yahoo was a highly successful attention seeker for many years. While it still attracts a large number of pageviews the market value of the portion of advertising-supported portion of the business is negligible according to various reports. 48 Third, mobile apps have provided opportunities for the creation of new attention seekers and have reduced the relative importance of incumbent attention seekers. Facebook, for example, has become one of the largest online advertising platforms in the world through its success in attracting attention of mobile device users and selling that attention to advertisers. It now provides three of the ten mobile apps that attract the largest number of page views. 49 Traditional search advertising, while still important on mobile, is much less significant than it is on the web.
D. Market Shares as Indicia of Market Power
A number of commentators have pointed out that market shares must be used with care in assessing market power. 50 This advice is particularly sound when it comes to measuring market power on the consumer side of online attention platforms. In traditional markets sound practice involves measuring market shares based on value to account for quality differences between products. It also makes sense to focus on price because it is an important dimension of competition. Most online attention seekers do not charge consumers for using the platform. Price is therefore not available as a measure of quality differences and for that matter is not an important element of competition relative to the content and service subsidies.
Market shares are poor indicia of market power for online attention seekers in part because precise market boundaries are more difficult to establish. Narrow market definitions, confined to functional substitutes for the content or services provided by the platform, seldom make sense because consumers shift their attention fluidly among different platforms. That is not to say that a broad definition is appropriate either since many platforms have some source of differentiation that makes consumers more likely to give them their attention. To the extent market shares are used they should be calculated using different plausible definitions of the relevant set of substitutes.
V. Conclusion
Multi-sided platforms comprise an increasingly large portion of the economy, in part as a result of the technological changes described above. Online multi-sided platforms are now behind waves of creative destruction. Protecting competition in this part of the economy is important and competition authorities should be commended for being vigilant in making sure that dominant platforms do not violate the competition rules and that rent-seeking incumbents do not stand in the way of innovative new platforms.
Antitrust analysis, however, needs to adjust the standard tools for assessing market power so that they are accurate, as a matter of economics and mathematics, for multi-sided platforms. That includes recognizing that important implications of interdependent demand, and interlinked sides, for platforms. Particular care is needed to online platforms, and especially online attention seekers, because of the importance of non-price competition, the pervasive use for zero prices, and the role, at least for now, of intense dynamic competition.
